Studies
5 studies · CSV
- Moving from a ‘human-as-problem” to a ‘human-as-solution” cybersecurity mindset Zimmermann & Renaud (2019). International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 131, 169-187 A problematization analysis finds government, industry and hacker discourse treats humans as the problem, with controls designed to constrain them. The authors propose 'Cybersecurity, Differently', which assumes people are well-intentioned and builds on what contributes to positive outcomes and resilience.
- Is the responsibilization of the cyber security risk reasonable and judicious? Renaud et al. (2018). Computers & Security, 78 Argues that governments shifting cyber risk onto individual citizens ('responsibilization'), by issuing advice and leaving consequences to them, is contributing to cybercrime's success. Proposes a more active risk-regulation regime instead.
- Scaring and Bullying People into Security Won't Work Sasse (2015). IEEE Security & Privacy, 13(3), 80-83 Argues that people heed reliable, credible risk signals, but high false-positive security mechanisms teach users to ignore them. Instead of scaring, tricking or bullying users, security needs more accurate detection and less obstructive tools.
- Neutralization: New Insights into the Problem of Employee Information Systems Security Policy Violations Siponen & Vance (2010). MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 487-502 Employees' rationalizations for rule-breaking ('neutralization' techniques from criminology) explained intentions to violate security policy better than deterrence theory's sanctions. The authors argue policies should address these rationalizations.
- Users are not the enemy Adams & Sasse (1999). Communications of the ACM, 42(12) Insecure password practices (e.g., writing passwords down, linking passwords) stemmed from memory overload and poorly designed policies, not user carelessness. Security departments that withheld information and treated users as a threat worsened motivation and compliance.